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Joint Ventures (JVs) between western and eastern partners have mushroomed in recent years.
Not all of them have a chance to become successful. Trial and error is a basic principle of the
western-style market economy. A mixed blessing of success and failure appears to be the rule.
Given the manifold imponderabilities in eastern countries it is not difficult to predict that
many JVs will fail. A JV is like a marriage: not all of them will run into a happy future,
though at the start hopes are running high.
Highflying expectations, in a marriage as well as in a JV, are the main cause for failure and
dissatisfaction. In the beginning, partners tend to expect too much from each other. Later on
they compare their present situation not with that of the past but with their initial expecta-
tions - which were often unrealistically optimistic. Thus, a relatively negative assessment
does not need to be an expression of bad experiences but rather a reaction towards outcomes
remaining behind expectations.
As in a marriage the partners of a JV are not permanently honeymooning. They have to
cope with the worse, too. While a marriage should have much to do with love and affection, a
JV must be strictly based on economy efficiency to be successful. Furthermore, many western
JV-partners are polygamous, i.e., they are large multinational holding companies with mani-
fold participations in different countries. To be successful they have to reconcile the diverg-
ing interests of their partner companies. This requires a long-term and comprehensive strat-
egy-
The following paper on the JV between the Volkswagen AG and Skoda Automobilo-
vfi a.s.s. describes how close JV partners are tied to each other - and that they have to share
the burden of a setback occurring to anyone of them. The trouble with SEAT has clearly
pointed out the importance of well tailored investments and led VW to size down the ambi-
tious investment program initially designed for Skoda. This caused a lot of irritations between
the two partners and, moreover, aroused resentments of the Czech population towards foreign
investment in general. In a first comment the Czech Minister of Industry and Trade, Vladimir
Dlouhy, expressed his deep dissatisfaction: the son-in-law proved to be far less potent than
initially expected.
Mostly, however, public perception of such crises in JVs does not reliably reflect actual
changes in real conditions. As only bad news is good news the media focus on the negative
issues and do their best to keep them at the center of public attention. The paper demonstrates
clearly that the JV between VW and Skoda has developed far better than it has been realized
by the general public.
The paper was written as a contribution to the project No. 92-0123-R of the PHARE-ACE-
program of the EC "Joint Ventures in the Context of Investment Strategies of their Partners".
An earlier draft was presented at a workshop in Budapest from June 10th to 12th, 1994. The
workshop yielded two other papers dealing with the topic, one adopting a Czech, the other a
Spanish point of view.* Copies are available from the authors on request.
Klaus-Dieter Schmidt
Jana Sereghyovfi, "Recent Developments and the Perspectives of A.A.S. Skoda, the Joint Venture
established by the Volkswagen Concern and the Automotive Concern Skoda Mladi Boleslav
CSFR" and Maria Teresa Virgili, Benjamin Bastida, "Development and Perspectives of the
SEAT S.A. after the Acquisition by the Volkswagen Concern".1
• Multinational companies are global players on international markets and locational
choice is an important strategic variable for them: they are present in all countries whose
markets are relevant either to produce or to sell their products. Transformation of the
former socialist countries in eastern Europe has opened new playing fields both in terms
of attractive locations for production and in terms of huge unexplored sales markets. In
general, foreign markets can be served by either exporting, licencing or foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). The transforming economies of eastern and central Europe are mostly
very much interested in receiving the inflow of foreign investments. Key element to
make these undertakings profitable is to combine host country national resources - ac-
quired by the foreign investor - with resources transferred from his headquarters, namely
capital, production technology and further intangible assets like management know-how,
corporate identity and entrepreneurship. Easterners expect foreign investors to substan-
tially contribute to restructure and modernize their country's economic potential.
• In the long term, interests of national governments and foreign investors are converg-
ing: they both want the investments to be profitable as this makes the country benefit,
too. Nevertheless, in the short and medium term there is considerable leeway for dissent
on how this goal can be reached. Employment, wages and investment targets are highly
sensitive issues. Disputes about them may arise easily and erode the confidence between
governments and investors. This will be especially intricate if the enterprise under con-
sideration is not entirely foreign-owned but if national government bodies themselves
hold part of its equity.
I Skoda in the Context of the VW Corporate Strategy
The Volkswagen Group (VW) is one of the biggest multinational global players and its
companies are operating in 19 countries of the world. VW displays high interest in devel-
oping activities in the transforming socialist countries. It has taken considerable commit-
ments there since the beginning of the 90s (Table 1).
• Skoda is the world's third oldest car maker and the most traditional one in eastern
Europe. It was founded in 1905 by two Czech engineers, Vaclav Laurin and Vaclav Kle-
ment. In 1925 it was taken over by the machine building enterprise Skoda, Pilsen, and
adopted its name. In 1945 Skoda was nationalized; in 1950 it was transformed into a
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Source: Volkswagen AG (1993).• The Czech car industry was the most advanced in the former COMECON. It did not only
produce the largest volume of cars but was also one of the most successful eastern ex-
porters. 35 percent of Czech passenger cars were sold abroad and more than two thirds of
all exports went to western European countries. The largest buyer was Great Britain ab-
sorbing nearly one third of Czech cars sold to western Europe. The early orientation to-
wards western markets and the probably best equipped car plant in eastern Europe made
Skoda an attractive partner to western car producers. The more so as it offers low labour
costs, well qualified staff and is placed at a favourable location.
• The Skoda - VW joint venture was established in April 1991. It comprises several indi-
vidual corporations: the production site Skoda Automobilova' (Skoda a.a.s.) in MladS Bo-
leslav and three selling companies, one in each France (Paris), Italy (Verona) and Germa-
ny (Weiterstadt). Skoda a.a.s. in Mladfi Boleslav is one out of the 15 most important pro-
duction sites in 12 countries which are run under the roof of the VW group. It comprises
the main plant in Mlada Boleslav itself and two nearby plants in Vrchlabi and Kvasiny.
The three Skoda selling companies are part of the 14 major selling companies in eight
countries which belong to the VW group. This set of firms is complemented by SkoFIN
s.r.o., Prague, one out of the group's nine larger financial companies. At the end of 1993
total employment within the VW group was about 253 000 persons, of which Skoda em-
ployed about 17 000 persons (6.7 p.c). Over the past two years, Skoda was one of the
most successfully developing group members. It was not only able to consolidate but also
to noticeably expand its role with the group (Table 2).






















Source: Volkswagen AG (1993).
• Skoda a.a.s. is VWs largest commitment in eastern Europe and virtually the largest of all
western corporate commitments in the former Soviet bloc. Skoda represents an important
part of the Czech economy as it accounts for 3.5 percent of total employment and 5 per-
cent of total exports. As one of the most traditional Czech enterprises it forms part of the
national "family silver" and is considered to be highly important for national economic
self-esteem. Therefore, VWs activities in Mlada Boleslav are highly exposed to publicinterest. In its entrepreneurial decisions VW has to take proper account of this. Political
interference in running the company is to be expected as the Czech Fund of National Pro-
perty still holds 69 percent of the equity. The texture of interwoven property rights has
been reinforced as in April 1994 two high ranking Czech officials took seat on Sko-
da a.a.s.'s supervisory board. The minister of finance became board member and the mi-
nister of trade and industry was even appointed vice chairman of the board.
Entering the joint venture, Skoda a.a.s. has been integrated into the VW multinational
group and its global networks of supply, production and sales. The individual companies
of large multinationals like the VW group are linked with each other first, by the amount
and the quality of internationally mobile resources the group disposes of and second, by
the extent to which individual companies may be disposing of parallel capacities, i.e. ca-
pacities which are - to a certain extent - substitutional to each other as they are usable to
serve overlapping or neighbouring market segments. A common pool of resources and
substitutional capacities are tying the group of formerly individual, independent compa-
nies up to form a larger unit which has to operate under common constraints. With re-
spect to resources the group will be constrained by the extent to which it disposes of in-
ternationally mobile resources, namely capital - or creditworthiness -, advanced produc-
tion know-how and management know-how. Richness in common resources tends to
make the group prosper while scarcity imposes a burden which - however distrib-
uted - has to be shared.
With respect to capacity the group will be constrained as it has to ensure a fairly even
utilization of the potentially substitutional capacities it may have at different places. It
cannot allow for idle capacities at one place - threatened by closing down - and release
bottlenecks at other places by means of expanding facilities there. The group faces an in-
herent conflict between the concern of full or at least even employment of all existing
capacities - especially local labour - and the concern to shift production to those places
where productivity is highest. This conflict remains under cover as long as market devel-
opments are favourable but it comes into the open if markets are declining and parts of
total capacity are becoming redundant. By capacity links market fluctuations are usually
spread more evenly among group members than among independent enterprises. Fur-
thermore, group members are less vulnerable to market fluctuations as group member-
ship gives them easier access to international markets and thus opens up larger sales po-
tentials. On the whole and in the long term both resource links and capacity links can be
assumed to reduce market risks and to contribute to a more stable development of the
multi-company enterprise.In order to ensure that the strategic plans are properly implemented VW Wolfsburg dele-
gates managers from the headquarters, so-called expatriates, to each group company.
Managerial manpower at present times is urgently needed at many places due to pressing
general and regional problems. In recent years the car industry has suffered from reces-
sion and in 1993 VWs most important sales markets, the western European markets,
contracted by about 14 percent. In this setting VW is highly exposed to fierce interna-
tional competition and -being a high cost producer compared with other global play-
ers - it is forced to realize substantial cost cuts in order to regain competitiveness. As a
specific problem, staggering Seat burdens the group with huge losses. This tightens fi-
nancial restraints all over the group. Skoda, too, appears to be tangibly struck as invest-
ment volumes have been cut substantially.
The management know-how by which the group and its members are directed material-
izes both in the design of strategic devices and in the man power occupied with imple-
menting the strategy. The VW group strategy is designed in the Wolfsburg headquarters.
It outlines a federal organizational structure and lays down common basic rules within
which each member company operates independently, namely develops and keeps its
own brand label and tends its own market. This shall make sure that group members are
not entering into competition with each other on the same markets but rather that the
group as a whole is successful in reaching a larger share of the world's car markets.
Skoda is to be fully integrated into the group's efforts to improve productivity and prod-
uct quality. In order to become more competitive VW itself felt the need for comprehen-
sive restructuring. It substantially revised its strategic orientation and production con-
cepts. In this respect, VW had learned a lot from its Japanese co-operation partners. Ever
since it became involved in its projects with Nissan for producing the Santana in Japan,
and with Toyota for producing pick-up trucks in Germany, VW has been learning and
adopting advanced Japanese techniques.
1 The core element of improvement is to effi-
ciently manage the flow of materials through the plants. This is achieved mainly by Just-
In-Time (JTT) deliveries which require both to adapt internal structures and to establish
close partnership with suppliers which on their part, too, have to commit to new concepts
of production and co-operation.
Hartley (1992).Introducing JIT deliveries is embedded in a comprehensive approach of "lean produc-
tion". New plant structures
2 have to be implemented (interlinked production systems,
employee-oriented work procedures, JIT-suited logistics) as well as new lean managerial
structures. As innovation processes are developing dynamics of their own VW has la-
belled them CEP, Continuous Improvement Process, later even CIP
2, Continuous Im-
provement Process squared, in order to express outstanding commitment and fortified ef-
fort. The CIP
2-concept comprises all the elements elsewhere known as TQM, total qual-
ity management.
Starting out from production processes by CIP
2 its principles are also applied to improve
all further stages of the value creation process, including model range, R&D and co-ope-
ration with external suppliers. The model range policy follows a new approach which in-
tends to reduce the number of platforms used throughout the group. Henceforth within
each category of cars all model lines shall be built on the same platform (floor, engine,
gear, axles) and then will get their individual body shell. The "lean approach" to R&D is
based on the principles of SE, simultaneous engineering. Henceforth, all departments in-
volved in product planning, product development and market operations are allowed to
work jointly and parallelly in time - i.e. simultaneously rather than sequentially as in the
past - on launching a new car.
Throughout all departments, staff people are involved in the CIP processes. Building up
team orientation is considered to be crucially important. CIP workshops - of which more
than 1 000 were hold in 1993 - are generating a "snowball effect" by which improve-
ments are put into practice at considerable speed. These efforts are extended in order to
integrate external suppliers as equal partners into the value creation process. The overall
target of CIP is to establish an integrated system of production and procurement through-
out the whole group while at the same time preserving its "federal" structure, namely the
individual brands which shall retain their distinctive identity.
There are some striking similarities between the Czech and the Spanish car industry and
the role VW plays in each environment.
3 Both by production and by sales VW is one of
the major players in either country. Furthermore, both Skoda and Seat produce small,
cheap cars and serve neighbouring market segments. In this setting Czechs feel some ri-
valry with their Spanish sister company and suspect to come off badly - or even to be
2 Famous example for the "factory of the future" already at work has been VW's Hall 54 at Wolfs-
burg. The next generation of modern production facilities has been put into operation in Matorell,
Spain, and in Mosel near Zwickau in Germany.
3 For a detailed analysis of VW's Spanish subsidiary Seat see Virgili, Bastida (1994).exploited in favour of Seat - when financial funds are (re)allocated. From an outsider's
perspective it may appear to be merely coincidence that Seat experienced huge losses
while Skoda was able to pass the break-even point and even succeeded to return a profit.
Some Czech observers, though, anxious about Skoda's development are sure to perceive a
causal relationship between the actual increase of funds allocated to Seat and the recently
curtailed investment programs for Skoda. Evidently, both companies draw on the group's
financial resources - although to a considerably different degree. While Seat fell into
acute crisis and virtually called for a rescue operation, Skoda is a basically healthy com-
pany in need of restructuring in order to become internationally competitive. As a rule, if
funds are to yield highest returns they have to be allocated to where they are most ur-
gently needed. And as a matter of fact, at a certain point of time the urgency to refloat
Seat was evidently exceeding the needs of restructuring Skoda. It is of no surprise that in
this setting the group's overall allocation scheme has been modified such that Seat re-
ceived a greater weight and more funds than otherwise. A similar shift of resources to-
wards Seat occurred with respect to management know-how. Detlev Schmidt, for in-
stance, said to be VWs top sales manager, first was in charge of selling Skoda cars and
realized a remarkable success for the Czech company. Then he went to Spain helping
troubled Seat to recover. Reportedly, he reached outstanding results there, too.
II Negotiations and Acquisition Agreements
• Already as early as 1987 VW established first contacts with Skoda. This was done on an
informal basis by exchanging letters of understanding and intended to provide operation-
al support. The activities of VW in Mlada Boleslav are inspired by strategic considera-
tions: VW intends to preempt its competitors by developing the potential Skoda offers
with respect to the eastern European markets. This holds in terms of production capacity
and in terms of relatively cheap, qualified labour as well as in terms of sales opportuni-
ties on eastern markets. In addition, certain segments of western markets shall be served
from VWs Czech production base.
• In 1991 VW won the public tender - organized by Price Waterhouse, an international in-
vestment house - by which Skoda was privatized. The main reason why VW had gained
an edge on Renault, its strongest competitor in the bidding process, was that VW other
than Renault promised to continue the operation of Skoda as an independent brand. This
feature of the privatization process was important for political and psychological reasons
as the Czechs give high priority to continuing their engineering tradition. Evidently, it
fits well into the VW corporate strategy where each brand is supposed to cultivate its
own image and to serve its own market.In equity arrangements VW usually goes for majority participations of at least 50.5 per-
cent. In the case of Skoda though, political and.psychological considerations were imped-
ing this and VW accepted to acquire a minority stake of only 31 percent (620 mill. DM)
in the company's equity. Nevertheless, VW has full say in running the company. In addi-
tion, the acquisition contract included an option to raise VWs share up to 50.5 percent in
1994 and up to 70 percent in 1995. This would require further capital injections of
580 mill. DM and turn the Czech company from a joint venture into a fully fledged VW
subsidiary. However, the option to raise VWs equity share up to 70 percent temporarily
appeared to be endangered as the Czech government suspected that with revising the
Skoda investment program the once defined development targets would have been re-
nounced, too.
The acquisition agreement included a two-year tax holiday which expired at the end of
1993. Since then Skoda has been subject to corporate tax at a rate of about 45 percent.
The effective tax rate, though, is expected to be only minimal, thanks to depreciation al-
lowances on capital expenditures and a five-year tax loss carry forward ("Verlustvor-
trag") allowed under the new Czech tax code. Furthermore, the government released
Skoda from around 5.5 bill. CZK of old debts and took responsibility for cleaning up en-
vironmental pollution. The Czech government also granted trade protection to Sko-
da a.a.s.: first, components needed for production were allowed to be imported duty-free
as long as the volume of imported components would not exceed the volume of those
which were exported. Second, the Czech government agreed to levy an import duty of
19 percent ad valorem on newly produced foreign cars. The rate shall be reduced over
time and the tariff is scheduled to expire in 2001. Tariffs which are levied on imported
second-hand cars are varying according to the car's age. Thus, on the domestic market
Skoda enjoys a certain, though decreasing degree of trade protection. On export markets
basically GATT rules are applied.
The mainstays for Skoda's future development have been an integral part of the negotia-
tion process but only became an informal part of the acquisition agreement. VW commit-
ted itself to effect an 8.2 bill. DM investment program for Skoda over the next 10 years
including the modernization of existing facilities, building a new car plant, doubling pro-
duction capacity up to around 400 000 cars a year by the end of the decade, developing
new models to extend the Skoda model range and expanding the Skoda dealer network
throughout Europe. Apart from VWs 1.4 bill. DM initial injection of new capital - in-
cluding its payment for shares - the Skoda investment program was scheduled to be fi-
nanced by Skoda's own cash flow and by bank borrowings on behalf of Skoda. Borrow-
ings were negotiated with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
International Finance Corporation and some private banks.Ill The Joint Venture Set-up and Its Development
Model Range Policy ' .
• In its joint venture with Skoda VW intends to develop Skoda into a fully fledged fourth
nameplate next to the established VW, Audi and Seat trademarks. Skoda: shall represent
the Central European counterpart to the Mediterranean character of Seat. While Seat is
considered to embody "southern vitality and joy of life" and to cultivate an emotional
image, Skoda is supposed to represent "rationality", namely to offer an "intelligent, ma-
ture technology" at an attractive relation of price and quality.
4 Since 1991 Skoda has
been producing three models: the Favorit, a hatchback model, the Favorit pick-up and the
Forman, a five-door combi variant of the Favorit. This model range is assumed to be
marketable on both national and international markets. It shall be enlarged by a new
model in the lower middle range until 1995.
Production and Sales
• Skoda's production and sales strategy is based on the assumption that there will be de-
mand for around 3 mill, cars in central and eastern Europe - excluding the former Soviet
Union - in the second half of the 1990s. The aim is to sell one third of production jointly
to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, one third to other central European countries, and
one third to western Europe. These goals appear to be quite ambitious, especially as re-
cession is hitting all target markets. In 1991, Skoda's sales fell by 8 percent from
187 000 cars in 1990 to 172 000 cars, though they recovered in 1992, rising by 16 per-
cent to 200 000 cars. This was achieved despite declining Czechoslovak!an industrial
production of 30 percent and 10 percent in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Sales in 1993
grew by about 10 percent against previous year while industrial production in the Czech
Republic was stagnating. These results are remarkable, especially if contrasted to group
performance: in 1993 world-wide sales of the VW group diminished by around 11 per-
cent against the previous year with sales of Volkswagen, Audi and Seat declining by
10 percent, 25 percent and 15 percent respectively.
• In 1990, two thirds of Skoda's production was sold on its home market. In 1991, domes-
tic sales fell sharply as the government opened the market to foreign imports by the re-
The image of VW cars has ever since been coined by confidence and reliability and was supposed
to appeal to consumers of all social strata. Cars of the Audi brand are targeting the upper segments
of the market They are made to satisfy demanding consumers, offering advanced technology and a
specific design.10
moval of a 15-20 percent import tax. A flood of privately imported second-hand cars and
the illegal export of Skoda cars initially distributed to local were cutting domestic sales
by around 27 000 cars. But a high volume of exports to Yugoslavia and Poland compen-
sated for declining domestic sales. In 1992, the war in Yugoslavia and Poland's imposi-
tion of tariffs on car imports (35 percent ad valorem) hit exports badly. This drawback,
though, could be overcompensated by successfully entering new markets in Turkey and
Israel. In 1993, the year of political divorce, sales to the Czech Republic and to Slovakia
slightly exceeded the volume of 1992. Sales to Germany decreased considerably by
70 percent, reflecting mainly that the unification driven demand boost was exhausted.
The performance on other western markets (mainly in France, Norway, Greece, Portugal
and the Netherlands) improved markedly while - due to trade barriers (Table 3), lack of
purchasing power and the war in former Yugoslavia - sales to central and eastern Euro-
pean countries were below the level of 1992. Again, this decrease could be compensated
by entering new markets, that year in Asia (South Korea e.g.).
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Source: Volkswagen AG, compiled from official sources.
• Skoda's sales operations have been completely restructured and now rely largely on a
network of exclusive Skoda sales organizations created on all the company's relevant
markets. In France, Italy and Germany they have been newly established for this purpose.
Skoda Automobile Deutschland GmbH, e.g., was founded in September 1991 and han-
dles imports and sales of Skoda cars in Germany. Two thirds of its equity are held by
Skoda a.a.s., the rest is held by Georg Urban GmbH, Kiel, whose owner was formerly in
charge of distributing Yugoslavian cars. Until the end of 1991, Skoda Automobile
Deutschland GmbH co-operated with the old Skoda dealer, Sanex Metall und Maschinen
GmbH who was a subsidiary of Motokov, the former Czechoslovakian state exporter.11
Since 1992 Skoda Automobile Deutschland GmbH has been the exclusive importer and
dealer of Skoda cars to the German market. Its main task is to establish a dealer network
covering the whole German market (Table 4). The target has been to establish a network
of around 600 dealers in 1993 and to enlarge it up to 1 000 in the following years.
Skoda's new dealers are mainly recruited out of its traditional distributors, partly out of
qualified independent workshops. Additionally, some VW-dealers are ready to set up
sales rooms and workshops exclusive to handle Skoda cars. In 1992 Skoda sold around
26 000 cars in Germany and had a share of 0.6 percent in the German market, rising up
to 1.0 percent in 1992. With Urban as the partner of Skoda Automobile Deutsch-
land GmbH, Skoda won an agent knowing how to sell eastern cars on western markets.
Urban reckons that Skoda's restructuring will proceed quickly and tangibly, probably
even faster than that of Seat when it was taken over by VW some 10 years ago.
Table 4 - The Skoda Sales Network
Number of dealers
of which














Source: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1991); Volkswagen AG (1992, 1993); Borsenzei-
tung (1993).
• With becoming a member of the Volkswagen Group Skoda also took charge of importing
VW, Audi and Seat vehicles into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. In 1993
Skoda sold.a.total of around 4 800 VW, 380 Audi and 2 700 Seat cars to Czech and Slo-
vak dealers.
Employment and Wages
With VW acquiring part of Skoda's equity and assuming full management responsibility
Skoda's staff has been completely taken over and has even been raised slightly from
about 16 400 to about 17 000 employees in the main plant and its two subsidiaries.
Finding new workers is not a problem with the average monthly pay of skilled workers
(6 000 CZK plus 36 percent non-wage labour costs) about 20 percent higher than in other
local industries. Low labour costs broaden Skoda's profit margins, particularly compared
with car manufacturers in Germany, one of the world's most expensive places to make
cars. Cost per worker at Mlada Boleslav is about 5 to 7 DM per hour, thus only a tenth of
the costs of a German worker (50 to 55 DM per hour). And Czech workers put in12
1.5 hours for every hour worked by their German colleagues. Skoda's Czech staff is
joined by some 100 expatriates from Germany whose main task is to introduce the VW
corporate identity and to make sure that new production concepts and technologies are
properly implemented.
Productivity and Product Quality
While investment policy is hotly debated, projects under way are progressing well: in-
plant logistics have been completely overhauled, a new paint shop has been built and a
new assembly line is under construction. Together with numerous smaller improve-
ments - of which around 700 have been introduced since April 1991 - these investments
contributed to enhance both productivity and product quality. Labour productivity rose
by 7 percent annually during the first two years of the joint venture's operations and by
further 10 percent in 1993 (measured in terms of daily production per employee). Simi-
larly, product quality began to improve. On a scale ranging from 6.0 to 1.0 (best mark)
Skoda started out at the level of 4.8 and meanwhile has reached 4.2. Its medium term tar-
get has been defined at 2.6, while the VW Group standard is actually set at 1.8. It is note-
worthy that within the Volkswagen Group it is Skoda who proudly reports the largest
quality improvements over the past two years.
Research and Development
R&D is an important element in restructuring as Skoda has the chance to take full advan-
tage of employing highly qualified research people at comparatively low wages. The
R&D team has been enlarged and now employs about 900 people. Parallel to enhancing
the team's size, its qualification profile is subject to considerable change. Its share of
technical draughtsmen is to decrease while its share of highly qualified engineers is to in-
crease. The team is supposed to develop a new Skoda model until 1995.
Suppliers
• Throughout the whole Volkswagen Group component suppliers are comprehensively in-
tegrated into the processes of improving product development and production. Thus,
Skoda's traditional suppliers and their restructuring became an integral part of VWs de-
velopment plan for Skoda. The new supplier concept aims to integrate suppliers as equal
partners in working through the value creation process and promoting them to become
efficient system suppliers. As improving production processes as well as product devel-
opment strongly rely on implementing just-in-time deliveries and on standardizing car13
components, close co-operation is indispensable. VWs approach of suppliers' integrated
development is considered to be one of the most advanced concepts of production and or-
ganization in the world's car industry and tends to make VWs commitment to Skoda be-
neficial to the Czech and the Slovak car industry as a whole.
• Skoda's competitiveness crucially depends on a sound purchasing policy, namely on
cheap supplies. Presently, Skoda purchases around 80 percent of its supplies in the Czech
and in the Slovak Republic; about 70 percent of its suppliers are located there (Table 5).
The purchasing volume of supplies accounts for nearly two thirds of Skoda's turnover on
car sales. Skoda realises its purchasing policy in close co-operation with its domes-
tic - both Czech and Slovak - suppliers. They, too, receive VWs assistance in order to re-
structure simultaneously with Skoda for its part and to meet Skoda's increasing demands,
especially to keep pace with rising quality standards. Creating an efficient national sup-
plier industry which shall be fully integrated into the Volkswagen Group is meant to se-
cure long-term competitive advantages for Skoda and, above this, to gradually develop
into low-cost high-quality sources of supply for all members of the Volkswagen Group.
VW, Audi and Seat have already decided to purchase materials worth 2.3 mill. CZK
from Czech suppliers.















Source: Volkswagen AG, unpublished data.
• The pivotal strategic device for fully integrating national supplier companies into the
group networks is to provide them with spots for production at Skoda's newly built fac-
tory. Suppliers will equip these places with their own technical facilities and will then set
out to build car components according to Skoda's requirements. By this, transport of
bulky parts and complex components is minimized as they are produced on the spot.
Suppliers only have to be presupplied with simple materials such as steel and tubes. Be-
yond cost reductions for transport and handling this approach of close logistic interlink-
ing allows for optimal information flows and a more efficient quality auditing.
• To participate in this development is a quite demanding task for Skoda's traditional
suppliers as it requires the companies' readiness to relocate as well as to substantially
push up product quality and production efficiency. In order to promote comprehensive
restructuring throughout the entire value creation process and to facilitate efficient pro-14
curement Skoda's suppliers are involved in sophisticated qualification programs which
include training, seminars and workshops with western partners as well as tough quality
auditing (Chart 1). Although the Volkswagen Group's quality targets are very ambitious,
considerable improvements have already been made.
Chart 1 - Supplier Qualification Program
Skoda: Assessing actual performance


















Source: Volkswagen AG, unpublished material.
• Besides locating suppliers under the very roof of the new Skoda factory a further element
in restructuring supply networks is to invite national suppliers to joint venture enterprises
in which foreign investors provide the local partner with both capital and know-how -
those very inputs which local companies did not receive by means of coupon privatiza-
tion. Volkswagen's commitment to Skoda has set the scene for many other western inves-
• tors to follow. So far, leading European and American suppliers have set up 26 joint ven-
tures with local companies and have initiated 12 greenfield investments.
Environmental Protection
• Environmental protection is a further element in VWs development plan for Skoda. The
overall group strategy, beyond the concerns of productivity and competitiveness, attaches
high importance to environmental protection. Against this background and confronted15
with considerable pollution problems at the Czech production site VW and Skoda are.
setting up a system of waste disposal management at Mlada Boleslav. A concept has been
elaborated which in a first stage specifies all types of waste which are occurring, the :
places where they are liable to be produced, the location of waste collection containers as
well as the necessary in-plant logistics to be implemented in the new paint shop, press
shop and body shell shop which are under construction in Mlada Boleslav. In a further
stage the'entire waste infrastructure shall be reviewed. The ultimate goal is to develop a
waste-disposal structure which allows to achieve the optimal recycling rate for each ma-
terial.
Investment Policy
• When Skoda and VW were negotiating the establishment of their joint venture, future in-
vestments have been an issue of crucial importance. VW presented a 10-year financial
projection totalling a volume of 8.2 bill. DM in order to effect product and technology
investments meant to underpin Skoda's competitiveness in the long term. The program
included the modernization of existing production facilities as well as the building of a
new car plant, doubling production capacity to 400 000 cars a year by the end of the dec-
ade, developing a new Skoda model and expanding the Skoda dealer network throughout
Europe.
• Apart from VWs 1.4 bill. DM initial injection of new capital - including its payment for
shares -, the Skoda investment program was to be financed by bank borrowings on behalf
of Skoda and from Skoda's own cash flow. Bank borrowings were negotiated with the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), a World Bank subsidiary, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD) and a group of private banks. These deals
had been nearly completed when VW announced that Skoda's investments would be cur-
tailed to such an extent that the already negotiated credits were not needed. This astound-
ing announcement caused a lot of rumour in the general public and serious irritations be-
tween the Czech and German partners. VW argued that the initially agreed targets of re-
structuring, capacity growth and technology development could be realized with a sub-
stantially smaller volume of funds.
• Revising the investment program comprised both a major reduction of its financial vol-
ume and a minor reduction with respect to the envisaged projects. According to VW, re-
ducing the financial volume became possible, first, as Skoda made good progress in im-
proving its productivity - mainly by rationalizing throughout the whole enterprise, by
adopting a platform strategy of production and by benefiting from being incorporated in
the group supply networks, second, as the close integration of Skoda suppliers into the16
production process led to an utmost lean structure of the supply system and, third, be-
cause, due to recession, capital goods could be purchased at a 20-30 percent discount.
Against this background the financial volume of investments had to be downsized in or-
der to ensure an efficient use of funds so as to realize restructuring targets in a lean and
profitable way.
• With respect to envisaged projects only plans concerning engine construction at Mladfi
Boleslav will not be realized to the extent that has been initially intended. As future de-
mand for engines is expected to decrease and as capacities at German production sites are
under-utilised, engine construction in the Czech Republic will be established with a
lower degree of vertical integration than previously outlined. Still, Czech suppliers are
supposed to produce the largest part of the engines' components. These components will
then be assembled automatically in German plants while final-assembly, which cannot be
fully automized but needs a lot of handiwork, will be carried out at the Skoda plant. All
in all the decision to curtail the ambitious program seems both to reflect the concern of
investment efficiency as such and to correct an expansionary development course which
is not - or no longer - in accordance with expected market developments. Apparently, this
decision has been taken in the very last moment. But presumably it will save Skoda the
costly experience of getting oversized.
Restructuring Record
Over the past three years joint restructuring efforts of Skoda and VW have definitely
yielded positive results for the Czech car manufacturer (Table 6). All key indicators re-
veal a considerable extent of improvement and prove that Skoda is on its way to manag-
ing the crucial turnaround. Production increased by around 10 percent last year and pro-
duction per day rose by more than 8 percent each year. Similarly, turnover and sales
grew by 18 and 15 percent last year. Employment grew slightly over the past two years
and the break-even point has been passed already in the second year of the joint venture's
operations. Although not all initial plans have been realized at full degree it is evident
that such results as Skoda is able to report are the exception rather than the rule in enter-
prise restructuring - irrespectively if the task is to restructure an ailing western enterprise
or if it is to restructure a former socialist enterprise.17



























(a) For short business year since April 16th, 1991. - (b) End of the year. -










c) Whole year. -
. - (e) According to group consolidated accounts.
Source: Volkswagen AG (1992,1993); Borsenzeitung (1993); Handelsblatt (1994).
IV Summary and Conclusions
Companies which establish a joint venture are becoming bound up with each other and
are entering a joint future which offers new perspectives to each of them. On the one
hand, partner companies can benefit from each other by combining their' strengths - this
is why joint ventures are set up. On the other hand - which is a potential burden -, they
are also tied together when a setback may occur to anyone of them. And what is even
more, benefits and burdens are not only to be shared by the partners directly involved in
the respective joint venture but also by further enterprises which may be associated to
anyone of them. Furthermore, even enterprises which are linked to associated companies
by means of the value creation process, namely suppliers and distributors, are concerned
by the joint venture set-up. In the case of Skoda and VW it has even been explicitly
stated that both supply relations and sales operations are to be fully integrated into the
Skoda development plan.
• Establishing a joint venture draws up a new framework within which the partner compa-
nies have to take their entrepreneurial decisions. Decision making is effected on several
levels: strategic orientation, resource allocation and capacity utilization, including market
penetration. On the level of strategic considerations, partners have to agree upon their
long-term targets - in particular which markets to serve - and to attune their decisions. In
the case of Skoda and VW the basic strategic device is to keep four fully fledged inde-
pendent nameplates and to build up a federal organizational structure. In this setting
Volkswagen as the mother company sets out the targets and principles - similar to consti-18
tutional rules - according to which the group is operated while each group member is
largely independent in his day-to-day operations.
On the level of resource endowment, partners have to operate under a joint resource con-
straint. This constraint is defined by the extent to which the group as a whole disposes of
internationally mobile resources, namely financial funds and advanced know-how of
production, management and marketing. In a joint venture the major partner is usually
expected both to provide investment capital and to delegate some top executives while
the minor partner is supposed to contribute in terms of specific, locally based advantages.
In the case of Skoda, VW takes the role of the major partner acquiring part of Skoda's
equity and drawing up a comprehensive investment program in order to promote Skoda's
restructuring. Skoda on its part offers VW to be developed into an attractive high-quality
low-cost production site. Since the joint venture was established in 1991, the group's fi-
nancial restraints have tightened considerably due to an overall decline on the world's car
market on the one hand and due to the severe troubles of the Spanish group member on
the other hand. Increased importance of investment efficiency led to a major reduction of
the financial volume of Skoda's investment program.
On the level of capacity utilization the group will have to make sure that - as far as paral-
lel capacities are concerned, i.e. capacities which are substitutional to each other - the
rate of utilization tends to be fairly even at the individual places throughout the group.
Enlargement of capacity at one place will not be promoted as long as there are idle paral-
lel capacities at another place. In the case of Skoda such considerations led to only
slightly revised investment plans. With respect to market penetration group membership
facilitates Skoda's access to international markets while Skoda on'its part acts as the
group's bridgehead to the eastern European markets.
So far, Skoda has shown a remarkable performance in the partnership with VW, even
under difficult market conditions. On the whole, the Skoda-VW joint venture substan-
tially pushes restructuring of the Czech car industry and considerably contributes to
transforming the Czech economy. Within the joint venture national resources are used
more efficiently than before due to their incorporation into a world-wide corporate net-
work. For Skoda and the Czech economy the combination of cheap, well qualified na-
tional labour with advanced know-how and fresh capital opens new perspectives for
growth and development. For VW the commitment to and co-operation with Skoda al-
lows to strengthen its position on the world's car markets.19
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